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11/15
No 106 / 887

MAJOR-GENL. C. J. MELLISS' DESPATCH.
SHAIBA FORCE

No 250/G. dated 21-4-15.

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Report on Operations
on 13th April, near
SHAIBA.

No. 250-9.

Headquarters, 6th Division. C.
SHAIBA. 24th April, 1915.

From,
The General Officer Commanding,
Shaiba Force.

To,
The Major General, General Staff,
I. E. F. "D".

Sir,

I have the honour to submit reports on the Operations of the Shaiba Force on 13th and 14th April, 1915.

I arrived at SHAIBA by bellum convoy at 8. 30. p.m. on the 12th April with the 24th Punjabis (less I Double Company) and 6th Divisional Staff placed at my disposal by the Army Commander. A general all round night attack on the ^{landward sides of the} defensive perimeter was in progress at the time of my arrival. This attack was nowhere pressed home, but continued with varying intensity throughout the night of 12th/13th, the enemy endeavouring without success to cut the barbed wire entanglement at various points.

As senior I assumed command from Major General C.I. Fry that night after making myself acquainted with the distribution and disposition of the troops.

The night attack died away at 4.a.m.

The Cavalry Brigade in pursuance of orders issued by Major General Fry on afternoon of 12th instant and ^{approved} ~~confirmed~~ by me that night moved out at 7 a.m. towards NORTH MOUND in order to clear our right flank and ascertain the enemy's strength and dispositions to the North West. The 104th Rifles (Lt-Col Clery) followed as a support and were placed under the orders of the Cavalry Brigadier. The Cavalry, 7th Lancers leading, remainder following in

13th April.
S. R.N.A.
7th Lancers.
16th Cavalry.
33rd Cavalry.
3 squadrons
each unit.

support, on nearing NORTH MOUND came under a very heavy rifle fire from superior forces advancing from NORTH MOUND, the broken ground near House A, and from House B. The 7th Lancers, under Lt Colonel Cooke, made a gallant charge on NORTH MOUND and vicinity and a large number of hostile Arabs were put to flight. Trenches however immediately behind NORTH MOUND and House A were strongly held, and a hot fire was poured into the Cavalry ranks. A squadron of the 7th Lancers most gallantly led by Major Wheeler, actually charged the mound itself. Major Wheeler, closely supported by Jemadar Sudhan Singh 7th Lancers rode at the enemy's standard planted on the mound and both were shot dead in their gallant attempt. The remaining squadrons of the 7th Lancers, under Lt Colonel Cooke's command, made a gallant attempt to clear the enemy from the palm groves but from good cover the enemy's fire at short range proved so effective, that the 7th Lancers had to retire and Brigadier General Kennedy realizing that the enemy in force were firmly established and that his main body (16th and 33rd Cavalry) were exposed to a severe flanking fire from entrenched infantry decided not to press the attack and to withdraw his Brigade. I had previously instructed him verbally not to commit his Brigade at this phase of the action if serious opposition were encountered. This took place at 7. 45. a.m.

The actions of the Cavalry Brigade were well supported by "S" Battery R.H.A. under Lt Colonel Sykes, while the 104th Rifles posted just north of House C covered the retirement by a well sustained and accurate fire. I ordered the withdrawal to camp of this battalion on the retirement of the Cavalry.

From ~~THE~~ ^{POST} KILN ~~WHERE~~ where I established my Headquarters an excellent view of the whole of the terrain to the north of SHAIBA is obtainable and large bodies of the enemy were visible advancing near NORTH MOUND and to the East of it. At 8. 30.a.m. I ordered Brigadier General Delamain Commanding 16th Brigade to move out from the defensive perimeter with 3 battalions (2nd Dorsets, 104th Rifles and 24th Punjabis) with NORTH MOUND as his first objective, covering his advance with the concentrated fire of the 63rd

and 76th Batteries R.F.A. and 23rd Mountain Battery, whilst "S" Battery R.H.A. also co-operated. The concentrated fire of the guns and the engaging of successive enemy's targets was most skilfully controlled and directed by the Divisional Artillery Commander, Lt Colonel Cleeve, whose valuable assistance throughout the operations of the 13th I particularly desire to bring to notice.

The co-operation between Infantry and Artillery in the attack and indeed throughout the action of the 13th was most marked, and very largely contributed to the success of the operations. By 11 a.m. Brigadier General Delamain was in occupation of NORTH MOUND and the enemy many of whom had clung to their trenches with great tenacity were in full retreat to the northward. Over 90 of his dead were found in NORTH MOUND itself. Meanwhile consistent sniping and desultory attacks were in progress to the West, South West, and South of my perimeter, and troops computed at 3 battalions, were visible to the South West of the Brick Kiln and a considerable force to the Westward. I now decided to continue the clearing movement against this unbroken enemy, and incidentally to capture two of their guns which their teams owing to our accurate shell fire had been unable to remove.

With this object I ordered the General Officer Commanding 16th Brigade to make a partial left wheel pivoting on NORTH MOUND which was to be held to protect his right flank. I pushed a $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion 119th Infantry (Lt Colonel Chitty) to reinforce Brigadier General Delamain's left and ordered 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Norfolks 2 Double Companies 48 Pioneers) under Lt Colonel Peebles to prolong the line of the 16th Brigade to the left, co-operating with their advance. The Cavalry Brigade were again moved forward and placed under Brigadier General Delamain's orders, to protect his right flank. Supported by a sustained and accurate shrapnel fire from our batteries the enemy though in considerable force in well constructed trenches were unable to withstand the plan of our Infantry. Many surrendered and the 2

4.
abandoned mountain guns were secured. The Cavalry Brigade on the right flank succeeded in getting home into the now broken enemy, and accounting for more than 100 of them.

By 2. 30.p.m. the whole vicinity of the camp was clear of the enemy but large numbers could still be seen to the Southward in direction of SOUTH MOUND where 2 Turkish guns had been located. The General Officer Commanding 16th Brigade reported at 2. 35.p.m. that he was advancing on SOUTH MOUND some 3 miles distant and hoped to capture these guns. I decided that at this late hour it was not desirable to undertake a general engagement with the enemy main forces with my troops who had been under arms continuously throughout the previous night and were in need of a rest. I therefore issued orders to break off the engagement for the day and ordered a general retirement to the Fort at 3 p.m.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,000, many of their dead being left on the field while over 400 prisoners 2 guns and a standard fell into our hands.

The night of the 13th/14th in marked contrast to the previous night was entirely undisturbed by hostile sniping or shell fire.

Report on Operations
on 14th April, 1915.
near SHAIBA.

From personal observation shortly after dawn on 14th April, 1915 from ~~the MILN~~ ^{POST}, considerable bodies of the enemy were seen in the direction of SOUTH MOUND some 2½ miles S.W. of SHAIBA FORT, while the immediate vicinity of the Fort was practically clear of the enemy.

The exact whereabouts of the enemy's main force was uncertain. On the 12th April a large force had been reported to be at OLD BUSRA, while all reports pointed to the ^ABRJISYH WOODS being strongly held but it was evident that the enemy had been severely shaken by the action of the 13th April. I decided therefore to continue the offensive without awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the 30th Brigade (2 Battalions). These reinforcements would, I was aware, be necessarily delayed by the difficulty of transport through the area which is inundated to a depth of from 2 to 4 feet and which extends for some 8 miles between SHAIBA and BUSRA. Moreover the necessary line of advance to SHAIBA from OLD BUSRA had been, as I was aware, hitherto closed by the enemy, while ^{reports} ~~some signs~~ of withdrawal ~~to the~~ ^{in a N.W. direction} ~~N.W.~~ reported from near ^ABRJISYH WOOD^A, rendered it desirable to advance without further delay.

I therefore ordered the whole force (less 104th Rifles, 48th Pioneers and ^{3 field} guns as Camp Garrison) to start at 9 a.m. to engage the enemy wherever found.

Operation Orders were issued accordingly, 300 rounds S.A.A. and water pakhals were taken by the troops who carried a havresack ration.

The troops moved off at 9.30 a.m. in preparatory formation for Artillery fire, the 16th Brigade with the 23rd Mountain Battery, 22nd Company Sappers and Miners and 24th Punjabis attached, moving with their left directed on a point 300 yards to WEST of SOUTH MOUND while the 3 battalions of the 18th Brigade, with 17th Company Sappers and Miners moved off on the left of the 16th Brigade echeloned back, left refused. The Cavalry Brigade was moved wide

to - 63rd Battery
only 5 guns -

6

on the right flank of the 16th Brigade detaching $\frac{1}{2}$ Squadron to protect our extreme left flank, guns in rear of centre and Divisional Headquarters with the guns.

The 16th Brigade were directed on SOUTH MOUND with 18th Brigade refused on my left as I apprehended a possible attack from the direction of OLD BUSRA or ~~ZUBAIR~~ ^{ZUBAIR}. The advance on SOUTH MOUND took place under ineffective long range rifle fire from the enemy's advance troops - mostly mounted men who soon gave way before our advance, SOUTH MOUND being occupied and Divisional Headquarters established there by 10.30 a.m.

It now became apparent that the enemy's main force was in position in vicinity of BIRJISIYEH WOOD and that OLD BUSRA and ~~ZUBAIR~~ ^{ZUBAIR} were not strongly held. I accordingly ordered the left of the 16th Brigade to be directed somewhat N. of the Watch Tower whilst I ordered 2 Battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Bn Norfolk Regiment and 120th Rajputana Infantry) to pass from the left to the right rear of the 16th Brigade and the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade (110th Mahratta L.I.) to remain echeloned on left of 16th Brigade. Whilst these movements were in progress I rode forward to where the Cavalry Brigade were in position on my right flank, engaged in dismounted fire action. From this point I endeavoured to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position but owing to the mirage this proved extremely difficult. It was not possible to locate any of the enemy's trenches but I was able to determine that his right extended as far ^S ~~as~~ as the high Watch Tower but where his left rested I could not ascertain. On returning to Divisional Headquarters I therefore ordered General Delamain to direct the left of his advance on the Watch Tower and requested General Fry Commanding 18th Brigade to pass over his remaining battalion (110th Mahratta L.I.) to the right rear of his own Brigade. My plan of operations was to engage the enemy along his front extending from a point to the W of the Watch Tower while I drove back his left with the 18th Brigade and thereby threatened his line of retirement towards NAKHAILA. I ordered my Cavalry Brigade to co-operate with this object

while giving the Brigadier a free hand to seize any opportunity for vigorous action which might offer.

the right of It soon became evident that the enemy occupied a very extensive front of some 3½ miles and considerably overlapped our line. The 18th Brigade had to come up into line with ~~and on~~ the 16th Brigade ~~on its right~~ in order to engage the enemy along his front - the 110th Infantry being my sole reserve. By 11. 15.a.m. I discovered definitely that the enemy's line covered over 3 miles extending from ~~W~~ of Watch Tower to the North end of ~~BIRJISYH~~ WOOD ("Dry Wells" on map).

The 18th Brigade having come into line with the 16th Brigade a general advance from SOUTH MOUND was continued for a mile without incident. By 11. 30.a.m. the two Battalions in front line of the 16th Brigade (2nd Bn Dorset Regt and 24th Punjabis) became suddenly heavily engaged with the enemy in position at 900 yards distance from Dorsets and 600 from Punjabis, while on the right the 18th Brigade were also fully engaged the Norfolks, and 120th Infantry coming under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from trenches some 400 yards to their front.

The enemy's trenches were well sited and practically invisible from the front, while the glacis like slope of the ground trending towards the ~~BIRJISYH~~ WOODS afforded them an ideal position for defence and a large proportion of our casualties occurred at this stage.

At 1.p.m. I ordered the 18th Brigade to advance direct on the gap in the trees near the north end of ~~BIRJISYH~~ WOOD and the 16th Brigade to close the gap between the 2 Brigades - both to co-operate in the attack. Heavy firing now became general all along the line the whole of our Artillery being engaged in close support of the Infantry attack. At 1. 30.p.m. 3 casualties occurred in the Divisional Staff my C.R.A. Lieut Colonel Cleeve being wounded and his successor Major Edlmann being hit before he could take over his duties while Captain Cardew Asst: Director Army Signals was also wounded. At this

Commanding

period the General Officer ^A 16th Brigade ordered the 22nd Company Sappers and Miners to prolong the right of the 24th Punjabis, $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn 117th Mahrattas to reinforce on the right of Sappers and Miners and with these reinforcements a further advance was effected in this part of the field. The General Officer Commanding 18th Brigade ~~now~~ pushed forward $\frac{1}{2}$ Bn of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry on the right of the 120th Infantry holding the remaining wing of the 110th and No: 17 Company Sappers and Miners in Reserve but owing to an enfilading fire from the right flank the advance of the 18th Brigade was checked.

At 2. 30. p.m. I called on the Cavalry Brigade for vigorous action to assist the forward movement of the 110th on the extreme right flank. The Cavalry assisted by dismounted rifle fire, while "S" Battery. R.H.A. also co-operated.

At 3. 0.p.m. the fight was practically stationary the enemy clinging to his trenches with desperate tenacity - while the Cavalry reported their inability to press forward on the enemy's left flank owing to severe shell fire and the mud line. The Artillery were supporting our Infantry attack to the utmost but such support was extremely difficult to render owing to the mirage and the invisibility of the enemy's trenches. Our gunners did splendid work and I must mention one of many instances of it. The Norfolks were losing heavily and asked for further Artillery support. Lieut: Gilpin 63rd Battery R.F.A. went forward into the Norfolk firing line for observation of fire, and communication with his Battery Commander was maintained by Captain De Grey, Adjutant of the Norfolks, who from the firing line flag signalled back to the Battery the result of Lieut: Gilpin's observations. Many were the gallant deeds of resolute courage by all ranks on this day but this appears a striking example of the right kind of Infantry and Artillery co-operation.

The day was now waning and I told both Infantry Brigadiers that the enemy's position in advance of ^A ~~BYR~~ ^A ~~JISYH~~ WOODS must be taken and that a general advance with the whole of the Artillery in close support must now be made.

The troops responded most gallantly^z to this fresh call, the 76th Battery in action close to the Watch Tower supporting the 16th Brigade, the 63rd Battery and 23rd Mountain Battery the 18th Brigade,

At 4. 15.p.m. the 2nd Bn Norfolks and 120th Infantry under Colonel Peebles and Major Pocock respectively, dashed at the enemy's trenches with the bayonet, while the 110th also under heavy fire pressed unflinchingly forward on the right supported by "S" Battery and dismounted Cavalry fire. Almost simultaneously part of the 16th Brigade consisting of the 2nd Bn Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 119th Infantry (less 1 Double Company in reserve) and 1 Double Company 117th Mahrattas withdrawn from the left flank guard, made a general advance and by 5. 0. p.m. the enemy abandoned the front trenches all along the line and fled, many surrendering. At 4. 40.p.m. Operation Order No: 1 for retirement to commence at 5. 30.p.m. to SHAIBA was issued.

In the meantime at 4. 0.p.m. in view of the necessary withdrawal before nightfall the 48th Pioneers with all available Jaipur Carts were ordered out from SHAIBA. The Pioneers were directed to take up a rear guard position about SOUTH MOUND to cover retirement of the Main Body and the carts were also directed there to be ready to assist in the collection and evacuation of the wounded. The arrangements for the collection and disposal of the large numbers of wounded were ably arranged for by Lieut Colonel H.O.B. Browne-Mason, R.A.M.C. Offg: Asst: Director of Medical Services.

The retirement timed for 5. 30. actually commenced at 6. 0.p.m. owing to the difficulty of collection and removal of the wounded scattered over a wide area. Our withdrawal was entirely unmolested and the troops reached SHAIBA with all wounded by 8. 30.p.m.

It is impossible to conceive a more exposed tract of ground than the plain devoid of cover over which our Infantry had to attack the Turkish trenches cleverly concealed and sited. Our advance in the last 400 yards was down a glacis like slope.

It was on the crest of this slope that so many of our losses occurred. Splendid dash combined with resolute courage, alone carried our men across that bullet swept glacis. It was a sheer dogged soldier's fight and no words of mine can adequately express my admiration of the conduct of those gallant Regiments:- who won through:- viz, 2nd Bn Norfolks, 2nd Bn Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 110th Mahrata Light Infantry, 119th Infantry, 117th Mahrattas, 120th Infantry, 17 and 22 Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners.

It is gratifying to record the fact that all the Indian Troops engaged (24th Punjabis excepted) are old Bombay Presidency Regiments. They have proved on this occasion that they are worthy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the best troops that the Empire can produce and I trust that these Corps may be permitted to inscribe the battle honour of "EXR^AJISY^A" on their colours as a fitting tribute to their gallant conduct on this hardfought field.

12 awards in each British Battalion = 24
 4 10m's + 4 D.S.M's in each Indian Battalion = 40
 2 " + 2 " in each Coy. S.M. = 8
 72
 For remainder 18
 90

2/Dorsets = 9 } = 23
 2/Norfolks = 14 }
 24th Panj. = 12 }
 110th Mahrattas = 5 }
 117th do = 8 } = 50
 120th Inf. = 16 }
 119th Inf. = 9 }
 17 Co. S.M. = 1 } = 5
 22 Co. S.M. = 4 }
 78

11.

Recommendations.

I desire to bring to notice the specially good services of the following:-

Commanders, Staff, etc.

- 18 — Major General C.I. Fry.
Commanded his Brigade to my entire satisfaction during the battle of ~~BYR~~^A~~JISIV~~^A on the 14th; his Brigade behaved admirably under his direction.
- 19 — Brigadier General W.S. Delamain. C.B. D.S.O.
A very able Brigade Commander handled his troops during the action of 13th and the battle of 14th with marked success.
- 20 — Colonel R.N. Gamble. D.S.O.
I am much indebted to this Officer for the invaluable assistance he afforded me during the operations of the 13th and the battle of the 14th April. He is a Staff Officer of marked ability and character, very cool and collected. He should be in command of troops and I strongly recommend him for promotion.
- 21 — Major G.A.F. Sanders. R.E.
An excellent Staff Officer of great ability, very cool and collected. His services on my Staff during the operations of 13th and battle of 14th were most valuable to me.
- 22 — Captain B.G. Peel. 81st Pioneers.
A very useful Staff Officer.
- 23 — Lieut Colonel E.S. Cleeve. R.A.
A very capable Artillery Commander. As my Divisional Artillery Commander his services during the operations of 13th were of great value; the handling of the Artillery on that day being a decisive factor in the success of the Operations. I greatly felt the loss of his services on the 14th after he was wounded.

✓ 24 — Lieut Colonel U.W. Evans. R.E.
 A very able Engineer Commander of great energy and resource. He gave me great assistance during the operations of 13th and 14th April.

✓ 25 — Lieut Colonel H.O.B. Browne-Mason. R.A.M.C.
 Acted as my A. D. M. S. during the operations of 13th and at the battle of the 14th. His arrangements for evacuating the large number of our wounded during the battle of ~~DIRJISIYEH~~^A showed marked ability and organising power. I feel greatly indebted to him.

✓ 26 — Major H.A. Holdich. Brigade Major, 16th Bde.
 A Cool and able Staff Officer.

✓ 27 — Captain J.H. Carruthers. Staff Captain, 16th Bde.

ZUBAIR

Shaikh Ibrahim El Abdullah El Ibrahim of ~~Zebair~~^{ZUBAIR}
 Regularly furnished information of the enemy's movements. The information was almost always correct and the Shaikh must have incurred great trouble and expense in procuring it.

✓ 28 — Major H. Smyth,
 Intelligence Officer at SHAIRA.

Interpreter Mirza Ali,
 Headquarters, 16th Infantry Brigade.

I also desire to bring to notice the names of the following Officers who throughout the day conveyed my orders to various parts of the battlefield with promptitude and despatch at considerable personal risk:-

- ✓ 29 — Major A.T.S. Dickenson. Brigade Major 30th Infantry Brigade
- ✓ 30 — Captain A.J. Shakeshaft. 2nd Bn. Norfolk Regiment.
- ✓ 31 — Lieutenant H.D. Hickley. 2nd Bn 7th Gurkhas.
- ✓ 32 — Lieutenant H.H. Rich. 120th Infantry.
- ✓ 33 — 2nd Lieutenant Lemon. attached 104th Rifles.

... in spite of heavy losses.

Artillery.

34 - Major O.S. Lloyd.

Adjutant 10th Bde. R.F.A.

63rd Battery. R. F. A.

35 - Major H. Broke Smith.

36 - Lieutenant R. Gilpin.

9X No: 52668. Gr J. Stanley.

76th Battery. R. F. A.

37 - Major E.V. Sarson.

10 X No: 55119. Gr B Kirk.

23rd Mountain Battery.

38 - Major E.E. Edlmann. D.S.O., R.G.A. (Since died of wounds).

39 - Captain A.V. Jarrett.

Although twice slightly wounded and on the second occasion partially stunned continued to command his Section with great ability and energy.

6 No: 535. Gunner Harman Singh. ✓

7 No: 226. Dr Naik Sher Khan. ✓

8 No: 30. Gr Havildar Latif. ✓

Cavalry Brigade.

40 - Lieut Colonel C.A. Sykes.

"S" Battery. R. H. A. *Able commanded his battery throughout the operations.*

7th Lancers.

41 - Lieut Colonel G. Chesney Cooke.

42 - Major G.G.M. Wheeler.

(killed in action)

The initiative, dash and gallantry of this Officer marked him out for special recognition had he survived. I now recommend him for the posthumous grant of the V.C. which forms the subject of a separate application.

43 - Lieut & Adjutant G.L.B. Stones.

in spite of heavy losses.

7th Lancers. Contd.

9 Jemadar Sudhan Singh.
(Killed in action)

Recommended for posthumous
grant of Indian Order of
Merit.

10 No: 3574. L/Dafadar Ram Singh.

11 No: 3548. Sowar Buktawar Singh.

12 No: 1103. Kot Dafadar Kala Singh.

13 No: 2108. " Amrik Singh.

Engineers.

Searchlight Section.

No. 3726
11 No: 166. Sapper C.A. Wells. *PE.* ✓

~~E.E. Company, Bombay V. rty.~~

17 Coy, 3rd Sappers & Miners.

44 - Captain E.J. Loring. R.E.

45 - Lieut R.C. Lord. R.E.

14 Jemadar Muhammad Din. ✓

22 Coy, 3rd Sappers & Miners.

46 - Captain E.C. Whitely. R.E.
(Killed in action)

Quite an exceptionally
promising Officer, killed
whilst gallantly leading his men.

47 - Lieut K.B.S. Crawford. R.E.

15 Jemadar Ramswami Naidu. ✓

16 No: 1930. Hav Gangaji Rao ✓
Khanvalkar.

17 No: 2899. Nk Narayan Halatkar. ✓

18 No: 3955. L/Nk Said Hussain. ✓

Infantry.

2nd Bn Dorset Regiment.

9 - Lieut Colonel H.L. Rosher.
(Killed in action)

An able and most gallant
Commanding Officer whose death
is a great loss to the Service.

10 - Captain H.K. Utterson.

50 - Captain G.M. Herbert.

11 - Lieutenant H.H. Dean.

12 No: 6701. C.S.M. W. Daniels ✓

13 No: 5849. C.S.M. W. Warren. ✓

14 No: 8406. Pte Scadden. ✓
(Killed in action)

15 No: 8328. Pte Burt. ✓

16 No: 9059. Pte Scovell. ✓

17 No: 8483. Pte Jolliffe. ✓

18 No: 7909. Pte Sedgbeer. ✓

19 No: 8662. Pte Lloyd. ✓

20 No: 8744. Corporal H. Scott. ✓

2nd Norfolk Regiment.

1 - Lt Colonel E.C. Peebles. D.S.O.

Ably commanded his Regiment,
which under his direction
attacked with great dash and
spirit in spite of heavy losses.

2nd Bn Norfolk Regiment. (cont'd)

- 53 Major F. De B. Bell. (Since died of wounds)
- 56 Capt & Adjt C. De Grey.
- 57 Lieut R.T. Frere.
- 58 Lieutenant M. Burnett. R.A.M.C.

~~and spirit in spite of heavy losses~~

- Captain R.D. Marshall. - 54
- Captain A.B. Floyd. - 55

For conspicuous courage attending to the wounded in the open in the firing line under very heavy fire where his work necessitated his being very exposed. He lost his life in the firing line doing so, and his work was beyond praise.

- 3rd Class Asst: Surg: J.V. Fernandez. I.S.M.D. ✓
- 22 No: 7879. Private T. Bindley. ✓
- 24 No: 7925. Private H. Farnes. ✓
- 26 No: 5359. Sergt: C. Aldridge. ✓
- 28 No: 8390. Pte C. Smith. ✓ (wounded)
- 30 No: 6331. Sergt: J. Airey. ✓
- 32 No: 6161. Sergt: H. Solomon. ✓
- 34 No: 7014. L/Cpl C. Woodward. ✓

- 21 No: 6789. Sergt: F. Bolingbroke. ✓
- 23 No: 7840. Pte S. Chapman. ✓
- 25 No: 8200. Pte J. Chard. ✓
- 27 No: 7040. Dr A. Barker. ✓
- 29 No: 7609. L/Cpl J.H. Preston. ✓
- 31 No: 7359. Pte J. Murphy. ✓
- 33 No: 5676. Sergt: J. Savage. ✓
- 35 No: 8416. Pte E. Harper. ✓

24th Punjabis.

- 60 Lt Colonel S.H. Climo. (wounded)

A Proved soldier who commanded his Regt with coolness and courage.

- 61 Captain W.F.B. Edwards. (killed in action)

- 61 Lieut: M. Birkbeck.

- 62 Lieut: D. Hobart. (dangerously wounded)

- 19. Sub: Major Sakt Chand Bahadur. (wounded)

- 20 Jemadar Sohan Singh. ① ✓

- 21 Subadar Gul Akhbar ② ✓

- 22 No: 137. Naik Dula Singh. (19th Pun) (killed in action)

- 23 No: 4943. L/Naik Lal Singh. (wounded severely)

- 24 No: 514. Sepoy Pal Singh. I ✓

- 25 No: 405. Sepoy Vir Singh. (wounded severely) I ✓

- 26 No: 318. Sepoy Yarak. I. ✓

- 27 No: 4909. Sepoy Labh Singh. III ✓

- 28 No: 4886. Naik Sardar Khan. IV ✓

- 29 No: 4847. L/ Naik Bela Singh. IV ✓

- 30 No: 141. L/Naik Lal Khan. V ✓

48th Pioneers.

(63) - Lt Colonel A.J.N. Harwood.

Ably commanded the Fort Section of the Defences throughout the night 12th/13th.

(64) - Major H.J. Riddell.

31 Sub: Major ~~W.M.S.~~ Dula Singh. ✓
32 Subadar Ganga Singh. ✓

104th Rifles.

(65) - Lt Colonel C.B.L. Clery.

An exceptionally good Commanding Officer and in the field a cool and reliable commander.

(66) - Captain A.M. Cheeke.

33 No: 2898. L/Naik Teja Ram. ✓

34 Jemadar Chothu Singh. ✓

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

(67) - Lt Colonel T.X. Britten. (died of wounds)

(68) - Major H.C. Hill.

(69) - Captain R. Knowles. I.M.S.

Sub-Ass^t Surg. 2 ~~K~~ Keshanrao Kuperkar. - (1) ✓

(70) - Capt: and Adj^t A.C.S. Hind. (killed in action)

35 Subadar Shaikh Yasin. - (3) ✓

36 Jemadar Ramchandar Hase. (4) ✓

37 Jemadar ^{Dattaji} ~~Rajhey~~ Rao Kauvilkar. (2) ✓

38 No: 1498. L/Naik Sakaram. More. (2) ✓

39 No: 2050. Sepoy Hari Sawant. (5) ✓

117th Mahrattas.

(71) - Lt Colonel H.K. George. ^{Mac}

Commanded his Regiment with skill and determination.

✓ 117th Mahrattas. Contd.

72 - Captain A.W. White.

17
For conspicuous gallantry when in command of his double company. This double company reinforced the Dorset left and joined in the successful assault capturing 73 prisoners. The Officer Commanding Dorset Regiment specially remarks on the dash shown by this double company.

✓
73 - Captain W.B. Benton.
(105th Mahratta L.I.)

For conspicuous gallantry and coolness when working the machine gun section on April 12th, 13th and 14th. This is quite an exceptionally good Officer. His name came up for gallantry at the action of Sahil.

✓
74 - Lieut: N.K. Bal. I.M.S.

For conspicuous bravery in attending wounded men under a heavy fire in the open. He attended the wounded of the 22nd Company 3rd Sappers and Miners as well as those of his own Regiment.

Extract from a letter from the Officer Commanding, 119th
Infantry to the Brigade Major, 16th Infantry Brigade.

I have the honour to bring to notice the following
British Officers, Indian Officers and men for gallant conduct
in the action at Shaiba on 14th April, 1915.

Captain J. J. Harper-Nelson. I.M.S. This Officer at the
commencement of the action was with the Reserve. On seeing the
number of wounded men coming back from the front, he proceeded
at once to the firing line, and under a very heavy fire
administered first aid to a number of wounded, including Major
Cooke, 24th D.I. He had one bandage left when Major Labertouche,
119th Infantry, called out to him that he had been hit. Captain
Nelson proceeded to where he was lying, bandaged the wound, and
then with the assistance of 7909, Private Sedgbeer, Dorset
Regiment, (statement attached) got Major Labertouche on his
back and carried him out of the firing under a very heavy fire,
to a slight dip where there was a certain amount of cover.
Major Labertouche has since died of his wounds or would be
able to personally testify to Captain Nelson's gallant action.

X X X X X

True Copy.

Amerah.
4/9/15.

Lt-Colonel.
Commanding 119th Infantry.

Awarded D.C.M.
(I.R.O. 906,
dated 14th May
1915).

18

Copy of a letter (no number) dated Basra 21/4/15 from
Major H.W.F. Cocks, 24th Punjabis to the C.S. 119th Infantry.

I wish to bring to your notice the gallant behaviour of
Captain Harper Nelson I.M.S. your medical officer on the 14th
instant as seen by me. I was in the firing line of my regiment
and the portion near me had advanced considerably further than
~~xxxx~~ the rest of the line. We had previously been re-inforced
by your regiment and many of your men came up alongside with me
We got to the top of the slight rise and came immediately under
very heavy fire from front and left front which caused several
casualties at once. I was lying down and was hit in the
shoulder. One of your men said that your medical officer was
near, he was I believe within 10 to 20 paces of me. Captain
Nelson came at once and bound me up most carefully and coolly
under heavy fire and helped me to get back a few yards to
slight cover where I got a dhoolie and was taken back. I was
impressed at the time with the splendid coolness of his
behaviour and with his skill. I think he sent a sepoy of your
regiment with me and this man assisted me till the dhoolie
arrived. I calculate that we were within 400 - 450 yards of
the enemys' trenches when ~~xx xxxx~~ I was hit.

APPENDIX (2).

No. 7909, Private Sedgbeer, Dorset Regiment, states:-
I got touched up with the sun on the 14th, and was being taken back to Hospital. On the way however I had a drink of water, and feeling all right, went back to the firing line. I missed my Regiment and got mixed up with the 119th Infantry. I saw Captain Nelson the Medical Officer attending to a number of wounded in the firing line, and helped him to take a Major who was badly wounded on to his back. Captain Nelson carried the Major back to a slight where there was cover, under a very heavy fire. I took charge of a few men of the 24th P.I. and told them to keep up a rapid fire, and then went on more to the right, and reported myself to two Officers, whom I now recognize as Captain Carey and Lieut: de St Croix. Subsequently I assisted a wounded mule driver back to the Ambulance.

(sd) C. Sedgbeer. Private.

(sd) W.W. Chitty.

Lt-Colonel.

Commanding 119th Infantry.

18/4/15.

True Copy.

Amarah.

4/9/15.

Lt-Colonel.

Commanding 119th Infantry.

~~I have long observed the excellent work done by this Officer.~~

- 40 Sub: Major Balwantrao Savant. ✓ 41 Jemadar Sitaram Sellar. ✓
- 42 Subadar ^aSkharam Rao Jagtap. ✓ 43 NO: 2437. Sepoy Jairam Dalbi. ✓
Bahadur.
- 44 No: 2474. Sepoy Vithu Kadam. ✓ 45 No: 1883. Havildar Vishnu Aire. ✓
- 46 No: 2742. Havildar Dadu Agave. ✓ 47 No: 2915. Sepoy Abdul Gaffur. ✓

119th Infantry.

(75) - Lt Colonel W.W. Chitty. An able and efficient commander whose Regiment behaved admirably under his direction.

(76) - Captain J.J. Harper Nelson. I. M. S. (77) - Captain T. De B. Carey.

(78) - Lieut: A. De St Croix.

(79) - Lieutenant M. Eccles.

Successfully carried messages under fire from the Brigade Commander to his Unit. Subsequently displayed great gallantry in bringing ammunition mules close up to the firing line although 9 of the mules were killed on the way, and finally led a double company in the assault on the trenches.

- 48 Sub Major Bhairo Singh. ✓ 49 Subadar Uma Rawat. ✓
Bahadur. I. O. S.
- 50 No: 3639. Havildar Uma Rawat. ✓ 51 No: 4112. Sepoy Dhanna Rawat. ✓
- 52 No: 3887. Naik Nathu Singh. ✓ 53 No: 4166. Sepoy Gokal. ✓
- 54 No: 3846. Sepoy Ramlal Singh. ✓ 55 No: 4339. L/Naik Mukna Rawat. ✓
- 56 No: 4025. L/Naik Dewa Rawat. ✓ 3 No: 2940. Ward Orderly Sirpulrao Bhosle. ✓
- 4 S.A.S. Munishwamy Ramaswamy. ✓
I. SSM. D.

120th Infantry.

(80) - Major P.F. Pocock. An able leader who has rendered valuable services which are deserving of recognition.

(81) - Captain W.L. Miskin.

(82) - Captain W. Andrews. (95th Russell's Infantry) (died of wounds)

For conspicuous gallantry on 14th in leading a charge across ^{the open} against the enemy in position with machine guns

12th Infantry Contd.

54 Sub Major Khitab Gul. ✓
Behadur.

59 No: 873. Cr: Hav: Gunesh Ram. ✓

61 No: 1531. Sepoy Koom Singh. ✓

63 No: 1089. L/Naik Bhima Rawat. ✓

65 No: 1243. L/Naik Suja Rawat. ✓

67 No: 1662. Naik Seolal. ✓
(killed)

69 No: 1111. Sepoy Sujan Singh. ✓

71 No: 840. L/Naik Panne Khan. ✓

58 Subadar Sri Bahadur Singh. ✓

60 No: 1712. Sepoy Lachman Singh. ✓

62 No: 1511. Sepoy Gungadhar. ✓

64 No: 1202. Sepoy Rawut Singh. ✓

66 No: 1800. Sepoy Padma Rawut. ✓

68 No: 1549. Sepoy Chaman Singh. ✓

70 No: 1474. Naik Allah Baksh. ✓

72 No: 1742. Sepoy Jagdeo. ✓
(killed)

34 Divisional Signal Company.

18th Brigade Section.

No: 16. Corporal J. Slaven. ✓

74 No: 28. Sapper Abdul Jabbar. ✓

73 No: 45. Sapper Rangasami. ✓

16th Brigade Section.
Attached as Despatch Riders.

75 No: 996. Sowar Phuman Singh. ✓
(16th Cavalry)

76 No: 1289. Sowar Nikka Singh. ✓
(16th Cavalry)

21st Mule Corps.

77 No: 722. Dr Rhoda. (wounded)

78 No: 796. Dr Suchet. "

79 No: 632. Dr Khwaja. "

80 No: 190. L/Naik Aladad. (killed)

81 No: 176. L/Naik Sherbaz.

The Dorset Regiment being in want of ammunition the G.O.C. 16th Brigade sent up 16 mules with ammunition boxes. The behaviour of the drivers of these mules has been brought to notice by the O.C. Dorset Regiment and the O.C. 24th Punjabis, the latter describing them as heroes. 9 mules were killed. 1 driver was killed and 3 wounded, one escaping unhurt. The greater part of the ammunition reached the firing line, the drivers showing the greatest courage. ^{One} driver was seen holding on to his mules, some of whom were wounded, although wounded himself and under very heavy fire.

Medical Services.

83 - Captain R.E. Wright. I.M.S.

Displayed exceptional ability in handling his sub-division of No: 3 Field Ambulance throughout the day. He displayed particular initiative in proceeding to the firing line of the 18th Brigade under a heavy fire and by ascertaining personally the position of the groups of wounded was able to conduct a detachment of Jaipur Transport carts direct to the place where they were most required when speedy evacuation was most essential. He afterwards superintended the main advanced dressing station at SOUTH MOUND in a most efficient manner.

84 - Captain F.C. Fraser. I.M.S.

Displayed great coolness in bringing his sub-division forward under heavy shell and rifle fire and was in close touch with the 16th Brigade throughout the day. I was particularly struck by the steadfast behaviour of the A.B.C. men of this sub-division and attribute it in great part to his excellent example and leading

R. A. M. C.

85 - Lt Colonel J. Hennessy.

86 - Major F.C. Lambert.

87 - Major F.G. Foster.

I. M. S.

88 - Major L. Cook.

89 - Captain H.E. Stanger Leathes.

90 - Lieut: L.A.P. Anderson.

I. S. M. D.

5 ✓ 4th Class Asst: Surg: A.E. Phaire. 6 ✓ No: 972. 1st Class Sub Asst: Surg: Sundar Singh.

7 ✓ No: 402. 3rd Class S.A.S. Shaikh Mahomed Dada Sahib. ✓

Pack Store Sergeants.

8 ✓ No: 5887. Sergt: F. Hayter. 2nd Bn. Hampshire Regt.

Nursing Orderlies.

9 ✓ No: 9166. L/Cpl Parkes. 1st Ox & Bucks L.I.

10 ✓ No: 8601. Pte E. Locke 2nd Bn. Dorset Regt.

Pack Store Havildars.

11 ✓ No: 911. Hav: Ramlal Singh. 2nd Rajputs.

12 ✓ No: 2145. Hav: ^{SHAIKH HASSAN} Mahomed. 103rd Mahratta L.I.

Ward Orderlies.

13 ✓ No: 2399. Sepoy Nabi Bux. 119th Infantry.

Hospital Store Keepers.

14 ✓ Sergt: J.A. Bloomfield. G. I. P. Rly Vols.

15 ✓ Pte Moos. Poona Vol: Rifles.

16 ✓ 2nd Class Hospital Store Keeper B.F. Ghyara. Supply and Transport Corps.

Army Bearer Corps.

17 ✓ No: 9339. Bearer Samedin. 18 ✓ No: 9344. Bearer Dhonde.

19 ✓ No: 4485. Bearer Suhhan Singh. 20 ✓ No: 1196. Bearer Ramcharan.

21 ✓ No: 7480. Bearer Gariba. 22 ✓ No: 7485. Bearer Rafawa.

Army Hospital Corps.

23 ✓ No: 6147. 2nd Grade Ward Servant. Abba Pira. 24 ✓ No: 6352. 3rd Grade Ward Servant Gangaram Gainu.

25 ✓ No: 5308. 1st Grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Singh. 26 ✓ No: 6428. 2nd Grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Nathu.

27 ✓ No: 5207. 1st Gr Water Carrier Bhondoo. 28 ✓ No: 6032. 1st Gr Water Carrier Gainoo Baloo.

29 ✓ No.265 Bhisti Rajah Piussal

Supply & Transport Corps

30 ✓ No.266 .. Shaikh Amur

.. ..

2. I desire to record the valuable services of the Jaipur Transport Corps in the collection and removal of wounded from the battlefield. The transport drivers worked backwards and forwards to the firing line with great dash and devotion to duty.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

Sd.S.J.Melliss Major-General,
Commanding Shaiba Force.

List of Appendices to the Report on Operations
near SHAIBA on 13th and 14th April, 1915.

- o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-
1. ~~Statement of~~ ^{copies of messages (2), of order No 1}
~~issued by G. O. C. G. S. K. 2~~
 2. I. List of Officers with Divisional Headquarters on 13th & 14th.
 3. II. Statement of casualties in men on 13th.
 4. III. Statement of ammunition expended on 13th.
 5. IV. Strengths of Units engaged on 14th.
 6. V. Statement of ammunition expended on 14th.
 7. VI. Statement of casualties in men on 14th.
 8. VII. Statement of casualties in horses and mules on 12th, 13th, and 14th.
 9. VIII. Statement of captured Ordnance.
 10. IX. Order of battle of enemy on 12th to 14th.
 11. X. Return of prisoners of war and enemy's casualties.
 12. XI. Map of SHAIBA defences.
 13. XII. Map of country round SHAIBA.
 14. XIII. Large scale map on tracing paper showing dispositions on 14th ~~with G. O. C.~~
 14. XIV. Panoramas A, B, C, D, E, and F. ~~4~~

JHBBX
Appx. 7

Copy of a signal message from the Genstaff, 6th Division to
G.O.C. Cavalry, 16th and 18th Bdes, the A.Q.M.G. and Transport
Officer, No. 60-G dated 14th April 1915, 6-45 a.m.

60-G, 14th.

G.O.C. intends to move out at 9 a.m. with whole force less one
Bn. 16th Bde. and 1 Bn. 18th Bde. and 1 half section R.F.A. 200
rounds S.A.A. per rifle on man and 100 on mules, water mules to
be taken. Troops will be back this evening. G.O.C. to come to
see D1. Comdr. at SHAIBA Fort at 8 a.m. Troops form up West of
SHAIBA Fort at 9 a.m. 16th Bde. on right, 18th Bde. on left. Cav.
Bde on right flank. Arty in rear. Sappers accompany Brigades.

Copy of a signal message from the G.O.C. SHAIBA to the G.O.C.
18th Brigade, No. 63-G dated 14th April 1915, time 10-20 a.m.

63-G, 14th.

Cav. Bde. reported enemy to S. of S. MOUND and in ZOBEIR (at 10
a.m.) G.O.C. has made no alterations in plans.

Copy of a signal message from the General Staff, 6th Divn, to
the G.O.C. 18th Brigade, No. 66-G dated 14th April 1915, 1-10 p.m.

66-G dated 14th.

There is a gap between your right and Norfolks. Divl. Comdr. wish-
es you to close this gap by pivoting on your right. The 18th
Bde. have been ordered to come up with their left on the gap
near the North end of BARJ Woods. Both Bdes to cooperate at
once in attack. This was written after your message 13 received
at 1.5 p.m. G.O.C. 18th Bde. was here and received his orders ver-
bally.

1445x
Appx 1. Contd.

OPERATION ORDER No.1

COPY NO.

by
The G.O.C.6th DIVN.

Near BARJISIYAH 14-4-15.

1. Intention to withdraw to SHAIBA.
2. The R.F.A. will cover the retirement sending 1 Bde. to S.MOUND
3. The Brigades will retire by alternative battns. under Bde. arrangements commencing at 5-30 p.m. -
18th Bde. North of S.MOUND
16th Bde. S. of S.MOUND.
taking up successive positions on the way.
4. Cavalry will protect both flanks sending half Bde. to the South to protect our left.
5. All dead and wounded will be sent ~~will be sent~~ as rapidly as possible to the rear. Carts and extra Field Ambulances are coming out to assist.
6. Dead must if necessary be left behind.
7. 48th Pioneers are coming out now to S.MOUND.

Sd. R.N.Gamble, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 4.40 p.m. to:-

Copy No.

- 2 G.O.C.16th Bde..... by orderly officer.
3. ,, 18th Bde..... by hand.
4. ,, Cav.Bde.by Orderly officer.
5. C.R.A..... by hand.
6. A.D.M.S..... by hand.
7. 48th Pioneers ...by Col.Evans.
1. Record.

April 13th and 14th 1915. *Appx 2*

List of officers with General Melliss' Head Quarters.

Commanding Major General J.Melliss, V.C., C.B.,

A.D.C. Lieut.H.D.Hickley, 2/7th Gurkhas.

Colonel R.N.Gamble, D.S.O.

General Staff Major G.A.F.Sanders, R.E.

6th Division

Captain E.G.Peel, 81st Pioneers.

D.A.D.M.S. Lieut-Colonel H.O.B.Browne-Mason R.A.M.C.

Orderly Officers:-

Captain A.J.Shakeshaft, 2nd Bn.Norfolk Regt.

Lieut.H.H.Rich, 120th Infantry.

2/Lieut. Lemon, I.A.Res.of Officers.Attd.104th
Rifles.

HEAD QUARTERS, 6th (POONA) DIVISION, *Appx 3.*

Indian Expeditionary Force "D"

CASUALTIES IN ACTION

At SHAIBA on 13th April 1915

Between _____ and _____

UNITS.	BRITISH						INDIAN						FOLLOWERS			REMARKS
	Officers			Rank & file			Officers			Rank & File						
	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	
DIVL. HEADQUARTERS.																
16th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
2nd Bn. Dorset Regt.						4										
20th Infantry											2					
104th Rifles		3					1			3	40			1		
117th Mahrattas											3					
17th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
1st Ox. and Bucks L.I.											2					
2nd Punjabis											2					
103rd Mahratta L.I.											9					
119th Infantry			1													
18th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
2nd Bn. Norfolk Regt.						7										
7th Rajputs																
103rd Mahratta L.I.											2					
120th Infantry																
ARTILLERY.																
Headquarters, 10th Bde. R.F.A.											1					
63rd Battery R.F.A.						3										
3th " "						1										
82nd " "																
Headquarters No. 1 M. A. B.											4			1		
23rd Mn. Battery																
30th Indian Mn. Battery																
Divl. Ammunition Column																
Divisional Cavalry																
ENGINEERS																
Headquarters											1					
17th Coy., 3rd S. and M.																
22nd " "																
34th Divl. Signal Coy.																
14th Pioneers									1		1	8				
Supply Establishment														2		
Transport Establishment																
No. 6 Field Veterinary Section																
No. Field Ambulance																
No. " "																
No. " "																
Add Cavalry	1		5				1	1		6	17					
Total	1		9			15	1	3		10	89			4		

2 B.Os. since
5 I R & died
since died

3 since died.
Summary
B.O. Killed 1
" Wounded 9
B.R. & F. Wd. 15
I.Os. Killed 1
" Wdd. 3
I R & F Killed 10
" Wdd. 89
Followers 4
= 132. Add 4

	Brit. Officers		I. Officers		Indian R.&F.		
	K	W	K.	W.	K.	W.	
"S" Bty R.H.A.		1					
7th Lancers	1	3	1	1	5	10	1 man since died
16th Cavalry						3	
33rd Cavalry		1			1	5	1 man since died
Total	1	5	1	1	6	17	

Nominal List of British Officers killed and wounded.

"S" Battered R.H.A.	Captain Harrison	Wounded
7th Lancers	Major Wheeler	Killed in action
"	Lieut. Hunt	Wounded
"	Captain Lee	Wounded (37th Lrs)
"	Captain Church	" (I.M.S.)
33rd Cavalry	Lieut. Onslow	Wounded (21st Cavalry)
104th Rifles	Captain Chadwick	Since died
"	" Leckie	Since died
"	" Stoddart	Wounded
119th Infantry	Lieut. Haddon	Wounded

Units

 Royal I
 Royal
 Mounted

 6th Co
 7th L
 16th
 33rd

 16th
 2nd B
 117th
 119th
 104th
 24th

 18th
 2nd
 110th
 130th
 48th

 17th
 22nd

Ammunition expended on 13th April 1915. *Appx. 4.*

<u>Units</u>	<u>Rounds fired</u>	<u>No. of rounds per rifle</u>
Royal Horse Artillery 13 pr.guns.	42 per gun	-
Royal Field Artillery 18 pr.guns.	103 ,, ,,	-
Mountain Battery	57 ,, ,,	-
<hr/>		
<u>6th Cavalry Brigade</u>		
7th Lancers	9000	50
16th Cavalry	Nil	-
33rd Cavalry	Nil	-
<hr/>		
<u>16th Infantry Brigade.</u>		
2nd Bn. Dorset Regt.	5000	7
117th Mahrattas.	5000	9
119th Infantry	10,000	17
104th Rifles	42,000	60
24th Punjabis	2,000	6
<hr/>		
<u>18th Infantry Brigade</u>		
2nd Bn. Norfolk Regt.	Nil	-
110th Mahratta L.I.	Nil	-
130th Infantry	Nil	-
48th Pioneers	4,500	8
<hr/>		
17th Company 3rd Sappers & Miners.	Nil	-
22nd Company 3rd Sappers & Miners	7,500	7

Headquarters 6th Division

Appx. 5.

I.E.F. "D"

Strength of Combatant Units in Action
at BARJISIEH on 14th April 1915.

Detail	British		Indian	
	Officers	R & F.	Officers	R.&F.
6th Cav. Bde. "S" Bty. R.H.A.	4	109		
7th Lancers	8		10	181
16th Cavalry	12		11	277
33rd Cavalry	8		13	275
Total	32	109	34	733
16th Infy. Bde. 2nd Dorset Regt	24	685		
24th Punjabis	12		16	492
117th Infantry	10		16	598
119th Infantry	11		19	665
Total	57	685	51	1755
16th Infy. Bde. 2nd Norfolk Regt.	22	624		
48th Pioneers				
110th Infantry	11		14	610
120th Infantry	11		16	644
Total	44	624	30	1254
Hd. Qrs. 10th Bde	3	7		
63rd Bty. R.F.A.	4	104		
76th Bty. R.F.A.	4	108		5
23 Mountain Bty.	4		2	216
Total	15	219	2	221
Adqrs.	2			
Engineers 17 Coy. S & M	2	1	3	128
22 Coy S & M	2	2	2	149
Total	6	3	5	277
Grand Total	154	1640	122	4240

British Officers 154.
British R.&F. 1640
Indian Officers 122
Indian R.&F 4240
Total 6156

Sd. J.H.M. Davie, Major.

D.A.A.G.
6th Division
& Shaiba Area.

Ammunition expended on 14th April 1915

Appx. 6

oooooooooooooooo

Unit	Rounds fired	No. of rounds per Gun and rifle.
Royal Horse Artillery 13 pr. Guns	460	115
Royal Field Artillery 18 pr. Guns	1400	175
Mountain Artillery 10 pr Guns	710	118
6th Cavalry brigade		
7th Lancers	7000	38
16th Cavalry	7000	28
33rd Cavalry	5000	17
16th Infantry Brigade		
2nd Bn. Dorset Regt.	96000	140
117th Mahrattas	103000	173
119th Infantry	67000	100
24th Punjabis	65000	110
18th Infantry Brigade		
2nd Bn. Norfolk Regt.	110,000	178
110th Mahratta Light Infantry	40,000	66
120th Infantry	141,000	220
17th Company 3rd Sappers & Miners		
17th Company 3rd Sappers & Miners	3,000	24
22nd Company 3rd Sappers & Miners		
22nd Company 3rd Sappers & Miners	13,000	93

HEAD QUARTERS, 6th (POONA) DIVISION,

Indian Expeditionary Force "D."

Appx 7.

CASUALTIES IN ACTION.

At SHAIBA on 14th April 1915.

Between _____ and _____

UNITS	BRITISH						INDIAN						FOLLOWERS			REMARKS
	Officers			Rank & file			Officers			Rank & File			FOLLOWERS			
	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	
DIVL. HEADQUARTERS.																
16th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
2nd Bn. Dorset Regt.	3	13	.	31119	.	.										1 Offr. since died
54th Punjabis	1	5	1	6	.	18	111	5 R & F do. 3 I R&F do.
104th Rifles																
117th Mahrattas	.	1	1	5	.	6	83	5 do do
17th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
1st OxL and Bucks L.I.																
22nd Punjabis																
103rd Mahratta L.I.																
119th Infantry	.	2	2	2	.	16	80	.	.	1	.	1 B.O. since died
18th INFANTRY BRIGADE.																
Headquarters																
2nd Bn. Norfolk Regt	3	6	.	23	97	6 R. & F since died
7th Rajputs																
103rd Mahratta L.I.	1	5	2	.	20	110	1 B.O. & 4 IR&F since died
120th Infantry	3	2	2	1	.	29	158	8 IR&F since died
ARTILLERY.																
Headquarters, 10th Bde. R.F.A.				1												1 since died
63rd Battery R.F.A.							2									
7th " "							1	1								
82nd " "																
Headquarters No. 1 M. A. B.																
23rd Mv. Battery				3									10			1 BO since died
30th Indian Mv. Battery																
Divl. Ammunition Column																
Divisional Cavalry																
ENGINEERS																
Headquarters																
17th Coy., 3rd S. and M.				1												
22nd " "				1				1		39				1		1 BO&5IR&F since died.
34th Divl. Signal Coy.				1			1			3						Summary
48th Pioneers																B.O. killed 11
Supply Establishment																" wounded 42
Transport Establishment																BR&F killed 55
No. 6 Field Veterinary Section																" wounded 220
No. Field Ambulance																1 Offrs killed 6
No. " "																" wdd. 17
No. " "																IR&F killed 91
No. " "																" wounded 620
No. " "																Followers wdd. 2
Add Cavalry				1						2	19					
Total	11	43	.	55	220	.	6	17	.	91	620	.	2			= 1064 1064

Appx. 8

Casualty return of Horses and Mules
during Operations 13th, 13th and 14th April 1915.

oooooooooooooooo
Horses

Unit	Killed	Wounded
sg th Battery, R.H.A.	5	14
7th Lancers	38	82
16th Cavalry	3	44
33rd Cavalry	11	56
Wireless Squadron	2	4
Supply Column	1	-
Total	59	200
Artillery		
Hd. Qrs 10th Bde R.F.A.	1	-
63rd Battery	1	15
76th Battery	5	23
Total	7	38
34th Signal Company	1	2
Shaiba Transport	6	10
Grand Total	73	250

MULES

23rd Mountain Battery	1	&	15 3 ponies
48th Pioneers	2		5
34th Signal Company	1		1
16th Brigade	1		3
16th Bde. Signal Sec.	2		-
Shaiba Transport	2		1
Various Mule Corps	46		90
Total	55		118
Grand Total of animals	128		368

14th April 1915.

Appx. 9

RETURN OF CAPTURED ARMS ETC

brought into SHAIBA between 12th and 20th April 1915

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Ordnance B.L. (Calibre 2.80 inch Mountain Gun)		No.
Carriages, mountain		2
Guns, maxim		2
Mountings, Tripod		2
Gun machine Hotchkiss (French made)		1
Mountings, tripod, Hotchkiss		2
Breechloading rifles of sorts	about	450
Bayonets of sorts	"	200
Shells, B.L. Shrapnel (Calibre 4.7 inch)	"	150
Shells shrapnel and common (Calibre 3.25" 15 pr. Fd. Guns)	"	1400
" " (Calibre 2.80 Mountain Gun)	"	50
Cartridges, S.A.A. of sorts	"	380,000
Entranching tools of sorts	"	100
Tents	"	20

Also various fuzes cartridges etc.

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Besides the above many rifles were broken up on the field, and much equipment burnt.

The Cavalry also buried or destroyed at NAKHAILA on 18th April about 250 shells, 200 gun cartridges 2 drums of cordite 200 entranching tools.

6 Ammunition Wagons One Motor Lorry One Maxim Gun one motor bicycle 2 Maxim Gun barrels, One motor car (brought back)

ORDER OF BATTLE

of the

Appx. 10.

Enemy's forces engaged against us at SHAIRA and BARJISYAH on
12th - 14th April 1915.

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Turks

Cavalry	31st Cavalry Regiment.
Artillery	-----
Artillery	38th Artillery Regiment. 2 Guns mtn.
Commander OOD BEY (sick)	37th Field Artillery Regt. 16 guns 8.7 c.m. (4 batteries) 35th Field Artillery Regt. 12 guns 8.7 c.m. (3 batteries) 2 heavy. 12. 5.c.m.
	Total 32 Guns

Sappers	1 Company from Aleppo
Infantry	103rd Regt. 2 Battns. } 33rd Division under 104th Regt, 2 Battns } RAZZA BEY 105th Regt. 2 Battns } (killed by shell) 2nd & 4th Bns. Fire Bdc. 2 Bns. } 38th Division Murattebs reformed from } under ALI BEY remains of 38th Division 2 Bns. } believed to OSMANJIE Volunteers 1 Bn. } be a casualty BAGHDAD Gendarmerie 1 Bn. }
	Total 12 Bns.

Medical 2 Red Crescent Companies.

Each battalion was made up to 1,000 strong
by addition of Kurd Irregulars.

ARABS.

3000 under SAIYID YEZDI

6000 under AJAIMI (of which 1000 mounted)

Also about 2000 Arabs in "mashufs" (boats like
large canoes covered with bitumen carrying
about 10 men each.)

Appx. 11.

RETURN OF PRISONERS OF WAR
taken between April 12th and 15th
18 officers and 724 other ranks
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Enemy's casualties on 12th, 13th and 14th.

Estimated at:-

	Killed	Wounded
Regular Turks	500	1500
Tribesmen and mounted MUJAHEDDIN		2000
Troops other than Turks		1500
Mounted Turks		500

Total		6000

These figures require further confirmation.